Modeling club structures as bipartite directed networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a noncooperative game of network formation and identify conditions on network formation rules and players' network payoffs sufficient to guarantee that the game has a potential function. Our sufficient conditions on network formation rules require that each player be choose freely and unilaterally those clubs he joins and also his activities within these clubs (subject to his set of feasible actions). We refer to our conditions on rules as noncooperative free mobility. We also require that players' payoffs be additively separable in player-specific payoffs and externalities (additive separability) and that payoff externalities -a function of club membership, club activities, and crowdingbe identical across players (externality homogeneity). We then show that under these conditions, the noncooperative game of club network formation is a potential game over directed club networks and we discuss the implications of this result.
Introduction
Club theory and the theory of local public good provision has a long history in economics, dating back to seminal papers of Charles Tiebout (1956) and James Buchanan (1965) . Three types of approaches have been applied: price taking equilibrium theory; cooperative game theory, and; non-cooperative models of club/jurisdiction formation. There has been very little study, however, of club models where players can belong to multiple clubs. Also, even in situations allowing multiple memberships in clubs, no account is taken of the fact that individuals may be connected in different ways to the same club and have different connections with different clubs. Networks appear to provide a promising approach to modeling strategic club formation where players can have multiple club memberships with different connections within clubs and across clubs.
Modeling club structures as bipartite directed networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a noncooperative game of network formation and identify conditions on network formation rules and players' network payoffs sufficient to guarantee that the game has a potential function. Our sufficient conditions on network formation rules require that each player be choose freely and unilaterally those clubs he joins and also his activities within these clubs (subject to his set of feasible actions). We refer to our conditions on rules as noncooperative free mobility. We also require that players' payoffs be additively separable in player-specific payoffs and externalities (additive separability) and that payoff externalities -a function of club membership, club activities, and crowding -be identical across players (externality homogeneity). We then show that under these conditions, the noncooperative game of club network formation is a potential game over directed club networks and we discuss the implications of this result.
The feature of free and unilateral choice of club membership in our model also appears in other non-cooperative models of club/jurisdiction formation; see, for example, Demange (1994 Demange ( , 2004 and Weber (1997, 1998 ). The models and results of these papers have inspired our work. In particular, Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1998) show that their game has a potential function, Our model differs most substantially in two important respects: players may engage in activities within multiple clubs and engage in different activities in different clubs 1 and; there may be externalities between clubs -the activities of one player in a club may affect the payoffs to players in another club. Nevertheless, we are able to demonstrate that network formation games satisfying our conditions are potential games.
Our research is also related to that of Kalai and Schmeidler (1977) who introduce the concept of the "admissible set". 2 To define their admissible set, take as given a set of feasible alternatives, denoted by S, a dominance relation M and the transitive closure of M , denoted by M . The admissible set is the set A(S, M ) = {x ∈ S : y ∈ S and y Mx imply x My}. The admissible set describes those outcomes that are likely to be reached by any dynamic process that respects preferences. The admissible set concept can be applied to a host of game-theoretic situations, ranging from non-cooperative games, where a coalition consists of an individual player, to fully cooperative games, where any coalition can be allowed to form. As shown by Kalai and Schmeidler through a series of examples, the relationship of the admissible set to the set of Nash equilibrium depends on the definition of the dominance relation and, in some situations, the set of Nash equilibrium and the admissible set coincide. It is interesting to note that if the dominance relation is defined based on a notion of "possible replies", which can be thought of as "improving replies" (rather than best replies in the usual sense), then the admissible set is equivalent to the set of Nash equilibrium. The admissible set is related to "basins of attraction" for network formation games Wooders 2005, 2008) . In the framework of the current paper, in part because of the finiteness of the strategy sets, each Nash equilibrium strategy profile is a basin of attraction and the union of all basins of attraction coincides with (the network rendition of) the admissible set. Our current paper demonstrates a class of situations where there exists singleton basins of attraction, what appears to be an important property.
Club Networks with Multiple Memberships
We begin by introducing the notion of a club network where players can have multiple club memberships. Using bipartite networks we are able to represent any such club structure in a compact and precise way.
Let D be a finite set of players consisting of two or more players with typical element denoted by d and let C be a finite set of club types (or alternatively, a set of club labels or club locations) with typical element denoted by c. Finally, let A be a finite set of arcs (or actions) potentially available to all players. For each player d and club c, denote by A(d, c) the feasible set of actions that can be taken by player d in club c.
Definitions 1 (Club Networks with Multiple Memberships
is nonempty; and (ii) for all (a, (d, c)) ∈ G, a ∈ A(d, c). Let K denote the collection of all such club networks.
Given club network G ∈ K, (a, (d, c)) ∈ G means that player d is a member of club c and takes action a ∈ A(d, c) in club c. The section of G at d is the set of action-club pairs listing the clubs to which player d belongs and the action taken by player d in each of those clubs. The set
(i.e., the section of G at (a, c)) is the set of all players who, in club network G ∈ K, are members of club c and take action a in club c. Thus, the cardinality of the set G(a, c), denoted by |G(a, c)|, is the total number of players who are members in club c and take action a in club c, and the sum a∈A |G(a, c)| is the total number of players active in club c. 3 Note that the set of club networks is given by the union of all player networks over all players. In particular, K = ∪ d∈D K d . Also note that given any club network G ∈ K,
In particular, any club network G is given by the union 
Marketing network G 0 depicted in Figure 1 represents one possible product line-
market profile for firms D. 
while only three firms are active in the Paris market, that is,
We shall maintain the following assumption throughout:
(A-1) (noncooperative free mobility) Each player can move freely and unilaterally from one club to another and each player can choose freely and unilaterally his feasible activity within the club.
Thus any player can drop his membership and activity in any given club and join any other club and take any other feasible action without bargaining with or seeking the permission of any player or group of players. In this sense, our model of club formation is noncooperative. The assumption of noncooperative free mobility is quite common in other models of noncooperative network formation (see, for example, Bala and Goyal 2000).
Example 2 Figure 2 depicts the marketing network which results when firm d 1 noncooperatively changes its product line-market profile from By thinking of marketing network G 0 as the 5-tuple of player networks,
, we can represent the noncooperative move by firm 1 in the usual way as
and where
Thus, we can think of the move from G 0 to G 1 as being brought about by firm d 1 s noncooperatively changing its strategy from G 0
Noncooperative Club Network Formation Games
We will assume that (i) each players payoffs are additively separable in player specific payoffs, internal effects, and external effects; and (ii) that internal effects and external effects are homogenous across players. In particular, we will maintain the following assumption throughout: (A-2) (additive separability and externality homogeneity) Each player's real-valued payoff function v d (·) defined on the set club networks K is given by
where, Definitions 2 (Club Network Formation Games and Nash Equilibrium) (a) A noncooperative club network formation game is specified by a D-tuple of pairs
where
Potentials and Nash Club Networks
Our objective in this section is to show that under the assumptions of noncooperative free mobility (A-1) and additive separability and externality homogeneity (A-2), the club network formation game, (K d , u d (·)) d∈D , with multiple club memberships is a finite potential game. This will allow us to conclude, in a manner similar to Monderer and Shapley (1996) , that under assumptions (A-1) and (A-2) all noncooperative club network formation games with multiple memberships possess Nash club equilibria. We begin by defining the notion of a potential game over club networks.
Definition 3 (Potential Games and Noncooperative Club Network Formation)
The noncooperative club network formation game (K d , u d (·)) d∈D is an exact potential game if there exists a real-valued function P (·) defined on the set of club networks K such that for all noncooperative changes
We shall refer to any function satisfying equation (4) for all noncooperative changes as an exact potential function or as a potential.
It is easy to see that if
) d∈D is an exact potential game with potential P (·), then any club network contained in arg max G∈K P (G) is a Nash club network for (K d , u d (·)) d∈D . Moreover, since K is finite, arg max G∈K P (G) is nonempty. Thus, one way to resolve the Nash problem for club network formation games is to show that these games possess potential functions. Our next objective, therefore, is to show that for club network formation games satisfying noncooperative free mobility (A-1) and additive separability and externality homogeneity (A-2) an exact potential function can be constructed.
Following Hollard (2000) , let
In club network G ∈ K, if player d chooses action-club pairs G(d) and (a, c) ∈ G(d), then
is the difference between the internal effect derived by player d in network G from being in the group G(a, c) taking action a in club c and the external effect player d would derive from group G(a, c) if player d were to leave that group. Our main result is the following:
Theorem (Club network formation games are potential games).
) d∈D be a club network formation game satisfying noncooperative free mobility (A-1), payoff separability, and externality homogeneity (A-2). Then the function P (·) : K → R given by
is an exact potential function for this game.
Since the proof consists primarily of long and tedious elementary algebra it is relegated to the appendix.
The following result is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 above and Corollary
in Monderer and Shapley (1996).
Corollary (Club network formation games possess Nash club networks).
) d∈D be a club network formation game satisfying noncooperative free mobility (A-1), payoff separability, and externality homogeneity (A-2). Then the set of Nash club networks NCN is nonempty and for any potential, and in particular, for the potential given in expression (5),
In fact the argmax set corresponding to any weighted or any ordinal potential is also contained in the set of Nash club networks (see for example Monderer and Shapley (1996) for definitions and results).
Note that if we replace the set of clubs C with the set of players D in the club network formation above, then under assumptions (A-1) and (A-2) the resulting network formation game is still a potential game. In such a game, the typical network G is a nonempty subset of the Cartesian product A × (D × D) with typical element (a, (d, d ), where (a, (d, d ) ) ∈ G means that player d initiates a feasible (or socially acceptable) action a ∈ A(d, d ) towards player d . As in the case of club networks, these networks -which we might call social interaction networks -can be represented as the union of player networks G d ⊂ A × ({d} × D), where each player network G d represents a player's social interaction strategy, and in particular, represents the actions a player directs toward the other players in network G = ∪ d G d .
Consequences and Conclusions

The Kalai-Schmeidler Admissible Set, Basins of Attraction, and
The Noncooperative Path Dominance Core
Because all club network formation games satisfying noncooperative free mobility (A-1) and additive separability and externality homogeneity (A-2) are potential games, much more can be said about stability with respect to noncooperative network changes. In particular, we can conclude that no noncooperative improvement path forms a circuit and that each club network in K is either a Nash club network or is a network on a finite, noncooperative improvement path leading to a Nash club network (e.g., see section 3. and (A-2), the path dominance core is equal to the Kalai-Schmeidler admissible set (Kalai and Schmeidler, 1977 ) which is in turn equal to the set of Nash club networks.
The Ui Shapley Value Representation
Having done the tedious work of showing that club network formation games satisfying noncooperative free mobility (A-1) and having Hollard-type player payoff functions (A-2) are potential games, we can then use a remarkable Theorem due to Ui (2000) to conclude that, in fact, player payoff functions can be restated in terms of network-dependent Shapley values. In particular, by Theorem 2 in Ui (2000), for club network formation game (K d , u d (·)) d∈D satisfying (A-1) and (A-2) there exists a collection of network-dependent TU games {υ G (·)} G∈K such that for all club networks
where u d (·) is player d's payoff function given in expression (3) , N is the collection of all subsets of player set D, and υ G (·) : N → R with υ G (∅) = 0 is a network-dependent TU game in characteristic function form.
Other Relationships to the Literature
Relative to the applications of the admissible set concept in Kalai and Schmeidler (1977) , our model is restrictive in that both the number of arcs and nodes are finite. Much of the depth and beauty in the Kalai-Schmeidler results is in their treatment of situations with continuous strategy spaces and payoff sets. Fortunately, the KalaiSchmeidler methods can all be applied to infinite networks, as we demonstrate in research in progress.
The literature on economies with local public goods or clubs most closely related to the current paper is the line of literature including, for example, Demange (1994 Demange ( , 2005 and Weber (1997, 1998) , who study economies with a fixed number of jurisdictions and free mobility of agents between jurisdictions.
In the literature on potential games, as we have already noted our results are related to those of Hollard (2000) . Other important references in this literature include Rosenthal (1973) , Myerson (1977 
Appendix
PROOF of the Theorem:
) be a noncooperative network change brought about by player d 1 ∈ D. We have
First, observe that,
Thus,
and
From (8)- (11) we conclude therefore that
Next consider P (G 1 ) − P (G 0 ). We have,
and note that 
Moreover, note that 
Moreover, given the definition of the set S, 
From (14)- (18) 
Thus, we conclude that for all noncooperative changes,
